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Abstract
This article builds on the embryonic inter/trans/anti/disciplinary Trump Studies to generate 
a theoretical framework for understanding the Brexit outcome and Trump’s victory. The 
consequences for researchers operating in a post-expertise political sphere means that new 
theories are required to create innovative interdisciplinary solutions to difficult, defiant and 
troubling social and economic problems. Using Jean Baudrillard’s theorization of banality and 
the double refusal,we consider how higher education researchers remain engaged in public 
discussions of, about and with ‘the silent majority.’
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New phrases jut from our complicated present. Innovative tropes. Transgressive theories. 
Provocative slogans. Defiant knowledge. 
Extreme Anthropology. Deviant Leisure Studies. Ultra Realist Criminology. Brexit 
Criminology. Trump Studies.
Such terms and tropes open red wedges, disruptive interdisciplinarity and dangerous 
intellectual opportunities. These spaces are available to enter and expand for radical and 
progressive scholars post-GFC, post-Brexit and (maybe) post-Trump. At such a moment, 
banality rules but theory beckons. We certainly live, interestingly, in theoretical times.1 
Previously we lived, theoretically, in interesting times. In the last decade, studies on and by the 
global left have attached themselves to ‘theory’ and ‘theorists.’ But there has also been a mining 
of popular culture, high and low.2 The celebrity intellectual culture which has developed 
over the 2000s has produced open access online journals devoted to theorists such as Jean 
Baudrillard3 and Slavoj Zizek.4
Combining high theory and high pop, radical, edgy, cold, hard scholarship is emerging 
in this brittle time. Yet this potent knowledge is not emerging from the Ivy League, Russell 
Group or the Group of Eight universities. Instead, this dangerous knowledge is pulsing 
from unstable, dangerous institutions. Deviant Leisure emerged from Plymouth University. 
Ultra realist criminology derives from Teesside University. Extreme Anthropology originates 
from Oslo. This is not centred and safe knowledge. This is discourse from the edges. It is 
pervasive and promiscuous knowledge that does not abide by disciplines. It does not abide 
by sociological mantras or assumed truths of identity politics. It is not only highly theoretical 
but anti-empirical. Its relationship with science, and scientific methods, is similarly critical. 
While there are multiple marches for science,5 there are no protests for thinking, learning and 
intelligence. While empirical (even empiricist) science is a worthwhile fight in an environment 
of climate change deniers, where is the public support––or discussion of––tough, non-
empirical knowledge? In these theoretical times, theories and theorists matters. The Brexit 
result and the Trump victory cannot be studied in a laboratory. The silent majority will not 
sit in a petri dish, waiting to be viewed under a microscope. Different locations, positions and 
strategies are required. 
This is an article of attack and intervention in the political economy. It is not interested 
in media ‘representations,’ technologies or platforms. In building a relationship between 
Cultural Studies and Trump Studies, this article is angular, rought, brutal and sharp. It 
titters at the weakness of textual analysis, discourse analysis and content analysis. It shakes 
its head at simple connections between race, gender, class and politics. Instead, it creates 
space for Trump Studies, with a distinct and distinctive political and theoretical imperative. 
A significant, passionate and powerful edition of Cultural Anthropology emerged in mid-
January 2017 to explore the intellectual, personal and professional consequences of the 
Donald Trump campaign and election victory. Michael Taussig opened this edition with the 
phrase and discursive flourish of ‘Trump Studies’, arguing that ‘there is no normal anymore’.6 
Powerfully, Taussig posed the key intellectual question: How can scholarly research engage 
with, understand and transform the Trump presidency? He asked, ‘Can Trump Studies match 
its object of study’?7 Similar questions and problems are emerging in media studies, cultural 
studies and sub-disciplines such as fan studies. The changes to media platforms are more 
exciting than the scholarship in media studies. Fan behaviour is more innovative and incisive 
than fan studies can capture or recognize. The intellectual problem remains understanding the 
political economy in late capitalism. The meta intellectual problem is how to ‘be’ an expert in 
an era of post-expertise, or how to manage ‘the mastery of nonmastery’.8 This post-expertise 
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ideology is also post-consciousness and post-experience. Being black, a migrant, a woman, gay 
or lesbian is no longer––was it ever?––the basis of credibility and authority in academic life 
and beyond. Ageing white men and women ‘whiteout’ the lived experience of disempowered 
communities that have negotiated the consequences of discrimination, prejudice and 
oppression.
This articles asks: why trump? Such a question summons provocative subordinate inquiries, 
such as why Brexit? This project is not following Stuart Hall’s ‘Great Moving Right Show’. We 
have already arrived at this temporality and location. The question is what scholars will do with 
this reality. We grasp Jean Baudrillard’s theorization of ‘banality’ and ‘the end of the social’ 
to offer a strategy to place knowledge in anti-intellectual times. At the end of empiricism 
juts brutalizing Trump Studies to probe how and why citizens do not vote in their own best 
interests.
Trump Studies provides, as Bessire and Bond have confirmed, ‘a much-needed corrective 
to many conventional explanations of the contemporary’.9 Yet is Trump––Brexit, the burning 
Grenfell high-rise flats––a confirmation that the left has few solutions or answers to injustice? 
The surprising (non) victory of Jeremy Corbyn in the May 2017 election suggests that socialist 
goals and policies are re-connecting with a wider constituency. The volatility and agitation 
of the political landscape is clear. Donald Trump tweets. There is an ‘Oh Jeremy Corbyn’ 
ringtone.10 These movements are operating in a space where scholars and scholarship are silent, 
decentred and denied. Is this disconnection between politics and scholarship a recognition that 
‘experts’ have failed to move, to cite Antonio Gramsci, from commonsense to good sense?11 
The disconnection from participatory politics is clear. Less than one quarter of the US 
population voted for Donald Trump. The low voting turnout created conditions where 
disillusioned, white men and women could treat a presidential campaign with the gravity and 
significance of a tweet, responding emotionally and impulsively to deep, historical economic 
injustices. The necessity to understand the unemployed or underemployed white working 
class, which has been one of Michael Moore’s key projects, is gritty and crucial. Bessire 
and Bond recognized that, ‘is it not a caustic irony that the “working class” emerges as an 
explanation or politics just after it ceases to exist as an organized force in politics’.12 Sherry 
Lee Linkon summoned an evocative phrase and argument when she stated that, ‘the half life’ 
of deindustrialization is longer than ‘expected’.13 Guy Standing’s conceptualization of the 
precariat confirms the analytical and theoretical accuracy of that analysis.14 He shows that class 
is not configured through a lack of education, but by job insecurity.
Trump is to the presidency what 50 shades of grey is to pornography: weird, unintentionally 
funny and all the body parts seem to be in the wrong place. Trump occupies space and 
squeezes alternatives voices and views into unproductive boxes like ‘Mexicans’ and ‘Muslims’. 
But further, there is a profound question of not only progressive politics, but also the state of 
political debate. While gay rights, women’s reproductive rights, childcare and environmental 
protection may seem like the bedrock for social change, they are also the talisman for the 
disconnected and disempowered to gain from the blaming of others for their social and 
economic conditions. As Brandi Janssen realized, ‘while farmers mostly voted for Donald 
Trump, much of his platform is not favourable to agriculture’.15 When Trump focused on jobs, 
they are in the manufacturing sector, rather than working through the intricate post-fordist 
economies of rural and regional development.16 Similarly, the constituants of agricultural 
regions of Great Britain voted for Brexit. They gained from the Common Agricultural Policy. 
Therefore, why would voters vote against their own best interests? To understand selfish 
politics that do not operate in self-interest, it is necessary to poke and probe silent majorities.
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Shadowing the silent majorities
Baudrillard died in March 2007 from cancer, but his work continues to be published a decade 
after his death. His posthumous publications have been significant in shifting the long term 
view of Baudrillard––from a banal postmodern theorist to a global scholar with a mature 
system of thought which made sense of modern banality. His most recent posthumous 
publication (in a new English translation) from the 1980s, The Divine Left: A Chronicle of 
the Years 1977-1984,17 shines a light on the politics in France (and elsewhere) of the 1970s 
and early 1980s. Only French language versions existed during his lifetime. This collection 
aligns with his illuminating but misunderstood work of the time on what he called ‘the silent 
majorities’ in books like In The Shadow of the Silent Majorities18 where he investigates the role 
of the masses in the ‘end of the social’. He predicted a moment where a Brexit could emerge. 
Banality refused to cleanly hook into the hegemonic cloth. If scholars or citizens are interested 
in why the Brexit vote occurred in June 2016 in the UK,19 or why Donald Trump defied 
electoral odds in the USA, or why Pauline Hanson’s right wing One Nation party can call for a 
Royal Commission into Islam in Australia, then they can locate answers in Baudrillard’s texts 
from the early 1980s, exploring notions of ‘the divine left’, ‘the end of the social’ and ‘in the 
shadow of the silent majorities’. The chronicle of the years 1977-1984 in Baudrillard’s writings 
in The Divine Left show the scale of social, economic and political change in the years after 
punk.
Baudrillard’s mature system of thought was already in train by the time the Sex Pistols, 
Clash, Slits and the foundation for new wave emerged on the scene in 1976.20 By 1976, a key 
book in the Baudrillard oeuvre was written: Symbolic Exchange and Death.21 It was published in 
1976 in French, but not really fully appreciated by English-speaking readers until translated. 
A 1993 English publication helped reorient readers but even today his work is deposited 
into an intellectual dustbin labelled postmodernist. Crucially, Symbolic Exchange and Death 
contained the theory of reversibility which would become so important to Baudrillard’s 
writing until his own death. As Sylvere Lotringer, publisher of Semiotext(e) and long-time 
friend of Baudrillard, stated in the introduction to a posthumous Baudrillard book called The 
Agony of Power,22 ‘reversibility is the form death takes in a symbolic exchange’.23 In 1976, the 
year zero of punk in global popular culture, punk cultural stirrings were embracing antecedents 
that Baudrillard shared––the pataphysics of Alfred Jarry and Pere Ubu. In the mid-1970s a 
Cleveland punk band emerged with the name Pere Ubu to globally popularise the drama of 
writer Alfred Jarry from the late nineteeth century which had so fascinated Baudrillard since 
the 1950s. Baudrillard’s first short book explored Jarry and Pataphysics. As popular music 
historian Clinton Heylin noted, musician David Thomas in 1975 in Cleveland, Ohio named 
his band Pere Ubu after Alfred Jarry’s caricature king because, to Thomas, it added a texture of 
absolute grotesqueness, a darkness descending over everything within mid-1970s America. In 
his own lifetime, Baudrillard never declared any awareness of this popular music culture/Ubu 
connection, though he did once appear in a ‘punk’ costume of his own. He appeared in a gold 
lame jacket with mirrored lapels reading the text of his own self-penned 1980s poem ‘Motel-
Suicide’, backed by a rock band at the Chance Event held at Whiskey Pete’s in Las Vegas in 
November 1996. The only surviving photo shows the short, balding, academic Baudrillard 
appearing as if he was auditioning for a place in a mid-late 1970s punk band.24
Baudrillard’s attitude to power, law, culture, sovereignty and politics changed in this 
mid-1970s ‘punk’ period. The agony of power was as much about the power of agony. In 
his own agonising introduction to The Agony of Power, Sylvere Lotringer claims powerfully 
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and correctly, that Baudrillard’s two key ideas throughout his work were that, firstly reality 
had disappeared and became replaced by simulacra and secondly that there was a potential 
symbolic challenge in this disappearance. This mid-1970s period is crucial for understanding 
Baudrillard’s work for the remainder of his life, and especially its political implications for the 
post-GFC and post-Brexit as we enter what Slavoj Zizek has hailed as a ‘new dark ages’ and 
‘trouble in paradise’.25 What can be seen in hindsight as Jean Baudrillard’s ‘post-punk’ work 
is revealed in The Agony of Power, a book praised from within by Sylvere Lotringer as nothing 
less than Baudrillard’s ‘final intellectual testament’.26 The Agony of Power offers a different view 
of sovereignty and power from the classical legal conception of power often reproduced in 
major works of legal philosophy and sociology of law. Baudrillard’s perspective is a form of 
the ‘patasociology’ (echoing Alfred Jarry’s pataphysics) hailed by French theorist of ‘the social’ 
Jacques Donzelot who worked with Baudrillard at the University of Nanterre in France. 
In all this posthumous work, especially in The Agony of Power, Baudrillard offers a unique 
theory of power, incorporating what he calls ‘a double refusal’ by which he means the 
sovereign’s refusal to dominate as well as the subject’s refusal to be dominated. As he conveys 
in another posthumous book, Carnival and Cannibal in a passage repeated from The Agony of 
Power, the radicalism of his thinking is in the argument that power must be abolished. For 
Baudrillard, 
it is power itself that has to be abolished––and not just in the refusal to be dominated, which is 
the essence of all traditional struggles, but equally and as violently in the refusal to dominate. 
For domination implies both these things, and if there were the same violence or energy in 
the refusal to dominate, we would long ago have stopped dreaming of revolution. And this 
tells us why intelligence cannot––and never will be able to––be in power: because it consists 
precisely in this twofold refusal.27 
The refusal to dominate, or to exercise sovereign power, according to Sylvere Lotringer seeking 
to illustrate Baudrillard’s theory at its most banal, can be seen in the agonies of those involved 
in the revolts of May 1968 or the activities of the self-proclaimed ‘post-political’ Italian 
Autonomists in the 1970s, or the failure of the Communist Party and other parts of the left 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s in France. They were, in Baudrillard’s theory and enhanced 
by Lotringer’s interpretation, less than confident in wanting to dominate. They agonised about 
power, in both their resistance to sovereignty and their unwillingness to become involved in its 
exercise. Indeed, as Baudrillard has written emphatically, ‘power itself is an embarrassment and 
there is no one to assume it truly’.28 It is this configuration of power that punctuates Trump 
Studies. Power is embarrassing, an ill-fitting suit, an ill-timed Tweet, an unfortunate phrase. 
The reversibility as connoted by Baudrillard affirmed the commitment in not maintaining 
commitments.
Banality is important to our analysis, as is the double refusal. Best revealed in the horror 
and embarrassment of the successful Brexiteers and the snap resignation of David Cameron, 
there is both a refusal to dominate and a refusal to be dominated. The double refusal provides 
a framework to understand the irrationality––and denial––of power. Brexit and Trump’s 
victory confirm the change. Brexit and Trump are embarrassing, shameful, banal and ignorant. 
There is something sordid and impotent in these victories. The racism and xenophobia are 
too overt, distasteful and grotesque. While Brexit Studies is a potent intellectual sibling to 
Trump Studies, the anti-intellectualism of the latter provides the most productive fodder for a 
revisioned Cultural Studies.
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Return of the repressed amidst the double refusal
The double refusal––the denial to dominate and the denial to be dominated––lives in our 
current period which usefully has been described as an interregnum, following on from 
Gramsci. Before moving into a discussion of this term and its applications, it is important to 
theorizing why Trump was able to summon, frame and succeed in this social order of gaps, 
pauses, endings, refusals and instability. 
Trump was able to capture and tame the two key political movements of the 2010s that 
have been masked by the rise of the right generally and the alt-right specifically. These two 
processes are linked to political ideologies. They are, on the one hand, neoliberalism and 
globalization and on the other, economic nationalism/protectionism. The populist argument 
over the recent period (Donald Trump, Brexit, Marine Le Pen, Pauline Hanson) has been 
rhetorically pressed into favouring the second process and ideology. The neoliberal globalists 
from the centre and left are represented by politicians like Emmanuel Macron and Justin 
Trudeau. They configure a relationship between neoliberal globalism and specific social 
movements such as feminism, anti-racism and gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender rights. 
But the former neoliberals and globalists from the right (Theresa May, Angela Merkel, 
Malcolm Turnbull) now have swung towards the centre29 and promised what used to be seen 
as social democratic programmes which help their populations survive the current dark times 
and continuing effects of the 2007/8 Global Financial Crisis. Trump and others who were 
elected on the populist manifesto manage the contradictions of both ideologies. Upon his 
election, Slavoj Zizek termed Trump merely a centrist liberal.30 However Nancy Fraser, more 
accurately, described his election as ‘a collapse of neoliberal hegemony’.31 Her other example of 
this collapse was the Brexit vote. 
Brexit involved an argument between the ‘Blairite’ Tories (Cameron, Osborne) and 
the ‘Powell-lite’ Tories ( Johnson, Gove). Theresa May straddled the two positions, 
opportunistically assuming the Prime Ministership after Brexit. These are ideological 
arguments within the right: neoliberalism versus protectionism. Therefore, the left must 
develop an argument to completely separate from these two poles of debate. Wolfgang Streeck 
described ‘The Return of the Repressed’32 and argued that the battle between neoliberals 
and protectionists, globally, is set to last many years with great global uncertainty and danger 
to follow. He calls it an interregnum, borrowing the term from Antonio Gramsci’s Prison 
Notebooks. Gramsci confirmed that, ‘the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying 
and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’.33 
This is a key and important term to reclaim and understand. Scholars gain from understanding 
these ‘morbid symptoms’ and interpreting this gap or cessation in conventional discourse. This 
is not a war of position. This is a deathly vacuum that kills the ideas and the people that enter 
this space. The morbid vacuum was described by Zygmunt Bauman’s as a separation of power 
and politics, ‘institutional disparity’.34 Such an argument was based on Giorgio Agamben’s 
analysis that showed the interregnum is a suspension of social, political or legal systems in 
anticipation of new systems, structures and rules.35 For these Gramsci-enabled scholars, the 
interregnum is more than the cessation of routine. It is the destruction of one framework and a 
pause before a new system emerges. Importantly for this article and understanding this current 
period, Baudrillard’s double refusal exists in the interregnum. The ruler does not rule. The ruled 
do not wish to be.36
What such positioning demonstrates is the few options that were available for Hillary 
Clinton to manage neoliberal globalization and nationalist protectionism. Her husband 
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had deregulated the banks, freeing international capital. This decision was the foundational 
moment for the Global Financial Crisis. Therefore, trying to find a workable globalization 
from the centre left that was feminist, anti-racism, pro-gay, pro-abortion and regenerative of 
disempowered working class regions was not possible through Trump’s hyper-protectionist 
ideology.37 The remarkable reconfiguration and reimagining was most clearly visualized 
through the triumphant defeat of Jeremy Corbyn, where he won the British election while 
losing it. Not having to manage gender or race-based variables––being a white man––he was 
able to present a socialist and anti-austerity agenda. 
The modality through which Donald Trump chose to express this agenda was remarkable. 
Twitter mattered to the US election in a way never seen in international politics.38 But 
Trump’s use of Twitter was also aligned with his public speaking, saying the unsayable in a 
truncated microphone drop. But the vocabulary choice was also profound. Name calling of 
opponents, abusing women’s weight and discussing sex tapes were part of a wider linguistic 
portfolio. It is rare to hear such parataxis in public discourse. The use of phrases and clauses 
without grammatical alignment and often without connection between the ideas presented 
in a sequence was a stark differentiation from Obama who pondered and considered each 
word with caution and reflection. Described as ‘the crisis in our public language’39 by a former 
Director General of the BBC, he argues that there is gulf between the language and world 
view offered in policy and by the public. Yet was this gulf or separation new to the 2010s? 
These debates and movements, or lack thereof, since Bill Clinton and Tony Blair were 
enabled through the lack of a genuine left. Neoliberalism and financialization have not and 
will not deliver social justice. In recognition of this reality, Bernie Sanders erupted through 
the political process as a key figure in genuine opposition to Donald Trump. These two 
figures––Sanders and Trump––shredded the delicate dance between centre right and centre 
left, but also rendered Donald Trump’s interregnum volatile and unstable. The double refusal––
the denial to dominate and the denial to be dominated––was revealed through an election 
campaign that almost exceeded the oddity of Trump’s victory. Pilloried by the press, Jeremy 
Corbyn managed to deliver strong public speeches and work well with individuals, while 
maintaining his thirty years of commitment to peace, redistribution of wealth, the National 
Health Service, housing and free education. While the ‘victorious’ Theresa May summoned 
armed police on the streets of British cities to manage bombings and vehicular threats in 
Manchester and London, the Grenfell Tower fire performed more than any other social 
event the disregard and neglect of public good, public housing and the poor. Such a stark 
realization––confirmed by the death of residents and the shroud of a burnt building in the 
middle of London ––meant that Jeremy Corbyn could maintain the higher ethical ground 
and confirm peace, cooperation between communities and the necessity for a greater good 
in life and politics. This disparity was starkly revealed on the weekend of 24-26 June 2017. 
Theresa May was at a military event in Liverpool. Jeremy Corbyn was in Glastonbury. This is 
interregnum politics.
The banality of racism
I have people that have been studying [Obama’s birth certificate] and they cannot believe 
what they’re finding ... I would like to have him show his birth certificate, and can I be honest 
with you, I hope he can. Because if he can’t, if he can’t, if he wasn’t born in this country, which 
is a real possibility ... then he has pulled one of the great cons in the history of politics40 –– 
Donald Trump 
Trump Studies: The double refusal and silent majorities in theoretical times
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It is intemperate and incorrect to suggest that every individual that voted for Donald Trump 
is racist and ignorant and everyone who voted for Hillary Clinton was benign, vegan and 
progressive. In our analysis, we are attempting to understand the moment, the intellectual 
framework and the cultural momentum that enabled the election of Trump and some of the 
influences of these ideological standpoints. How does the double refusal apply to this context? 
In this article, we are probing and testing the assumption that Brexit voters and Trump 
voters had an identity to protect, and racism, misogyny, xenophobia and homophobia are 
merely attendant othering strategies to tightly align whiteness and nationalism. The banality 
of that identity, whiteness, colonizers and the ambiguity of the phrase ‘middle class’ (rather 
than ‘working poor’), created a ‘values- driven’ movement. Our theorization of whiteness is 
capturing a defensive, retracting, brittle and brutalizing ideology. It does not portray the early 
delicacy of Gerard Early41 or Robert Miles.42 It is a whiteness that grows and spurts in the 
spaces of the double refusal to create havoc, chaos and confusion.
These values were nostalgia, nationalism and colonial order. Doug Kiel described this 
movement with clarity: ‘The shift from an Obama presidency to Trump demonstrates 
that social justice can be sidelined when people who call themselves white prioritize their 
own needs over the needs of others’.43 The idea that after the Global Financial Crisis that 
a businessman––active in real estate and banking––would be considered a possibility for 
president of the United States demonstrates that the wound created by the collapse in the 
economy had been forgotten or displaced. Unemployment was managed effectively by Obama. 
But the structural problems of finance capitalism and real estate capitalism unbalancing the 
global economy into unpredictable and volatile cycles meant that the ‘threat’ of nations that 
maintained a balance of industrial and post-industrial goods––like China, Germany, India 
and Mexico––was recognized and promoted by Trump. Trump spoke of protectionism and 
the greatness of the United States. There is no excuse for racism or ignorance, but denial and 
displacement of uncomfortable theorizations of whiteness do not enable an understanding of 
the shift that has occurred.  
The election of Donald Trump solidifies that the shift to right wing political ideas is not 
coming or emerging. It is here. We wish to be clear: Trump is not the carefully calculating, 
natural leader of the Right. Controversial as it might be, Donald Trump was a chancer that 
captured conservative anxieties about the weak and weakening ties between nationalism, 
whiteness and power. Prior to 2012, Trump was never a voice of the right. He had been 
aligned with Democratic political views.44 Donald Trump as an unwitting, ignorant vessel, 
filled with racism, fear and loss, was a response to President Barack Obama as a threat to 
the American political system. We choose this position for reasons that are two fold. Firstly, 
there is danger in over-philosophizing Trump as a lone calculating and executing individual. 
Instead Trump should be viewed as a puppet, albeit a powerful one, in the larger context of 
global politics. Secondly, by using President Barack Obama and his ‘powerful symbolism 
of black advancement’,45 we can come to understand the steady rise of the Right. Gilroy 
noted that a new type of racism was arising in political discourse. He argued that it avoided 
being recognized as such because, ‘it is able to line up “race” with nationhood, patriotism and 
nationalism … homogenous in its whiteness yet precarious and perpetually vulnerable to 
attack from enemies’.46 The disdain for President Obama slots into this fear. He was the enemy 
within. He was educated, Christian, successful and heteronormative. He was the Sidney Poiter 
of politics. He fulfilled all the requirements of the American Dream: success on white terms. 
Yet his skin, his packaging, summoned fear, confusion, anger and irrationality. The delusional 
narratives about his birth certificate highlighted the irrationality. 
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In this bleak time for American politics, scholars must not deflect what it means for Trump 
to succeed Obama as president. Barack Obama embodied the loss of power from whiteness, 
which was particularly poignant for the far right wing of the Republican Party. His messages 
of hope and change were motivational, passionate and eloquently delivered. However it is 
the body from which these views were expressed that performed the decline of white power. 
President Obama’s election came on the heels of the Global Financial Crisis, which emerged 
from the neo-liberal and anti-regulatory Republican administration that developed a bailout 
package to large banks because they were ‘too big to fail’. In the minds of some economic 
and socio-political scholars, Obama was heralded as the saviour of the American economy.47 
Perhaps the expectations stacked upon him were unrealistic in both foreign and domestic 
policy, yet he was seen as a beacon of change when compared to the serious economic 
and military errors made by the previous Republican government. Trump’s now infamous 
campaign tagline of empowering the white working class seems like a twisted joke considering 
it was people like Trump who benefited from the declining financial power of blue collar 
workers. In 2007, the working class were not angry with the Democrats, but instead demanded 
to know how their Republican government had failed them. Nine years later the message has 
been manipulated and blame removed––whited out––from the Republican government and 
placed on the Democrats. This inversion was irrational, but potent in its banality. For the first 
time in the history of American politics, the dominant white population was being ruled by 
the ‘lesser’ race.48 As expressed by Boris Johnson, America was being ruled by a former colonial 
subject: ‘Some said it was a snub to Britain. Some said it was a symbol of the part-Kenyan 
President’s ancestral dislike of the British Empire  ––of which Churchill had been such a 
fervent defender’.49
This crystalized the fate white America was facing: they no longer had control of their own 
country. Obama was the manifestation of past injustices that aligned, regrouped and gained 
power. His black body captured colonial history. In this context, racism could no longer be 
minimized, displaced or disguised as a dog-whistle. It was overt and nasty: ‘Make America 
Great Again’ and ‘Take our country back.’ The ‘Again’ in the MAGA slogan matters. The 
criteria by which America was ever ‘great’ are debateable.
What makes the United States unusual is that liberalism has remained the punctuation 
for significant historical moments, beginning with Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation 
on January 1, 1863. Freeing three million slaves destroyed the foundation of the southern 
economy. That was the cost of social justice and this new order was enforced by the Union 
Army. This was the first of a series of liberal responses to structural injustices. Franklin 
Roosevelt’s New Deal in 1933, Harry Truman’s Fair Deal in 1948, that offered universal health 
care, John Kennedy’s New Frontier that guaranteed federal funds to create a post-segregation 
education system, and Johnson’s Civil Rights Act in 1964 all created, built and captured a 
distinctive pathway through liberalism. Obama’s presidency built on this foundation. But the 
key sociological absence in this history is a discussion of the white working class, a group that 
was socialized through American history to feel powerful through the colour of their skin, 
but was socially, geographically and economically immobile through a lack of education and 
regional injustices. Bonnie Greer captured the impotency of this group and how Trump was 
able to summon their vote for one last presidency. 
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Liberalism has become the consensus, the voice of reason, the beacon of civilization itself. But 
it forgot another group, just as needy, whose skin colour gave it privilege and safety, but not 
mobility. For them, liberalism took its eye off the ball. Now the American white working class 
is being conned by the present occupant of the Oval Office with promises of the return of ‘King 
Coal,’ steel plants, shipping, the land itself. But the future is robotics, AI, nanotechnology, 
biotechnology and other technologies … This reality, along with ageing demographics, means 
that time is literally running out for ‘Trump America’ and its equivalents in the UK and 
Europe, as indeed the arrival of Emmanuel Macron already suggests.50
‘Protecting’ borders and pretending that the fordist industrial revolution is still a functional 
model for production is not only nostalgic, but wrong. Similarly, the assumption that Christian 
white people are better, greater, more intelligent and benevolent that atheists and members 
of other faiths and races is not only ignorant and foolish, but enacts active forgetting of a 
white Catholic who promulgated the genocidal final solution through Europe. When Theresa 
May could only form a government through a partnership with the DUP, the political arm of 
the Unionist organization, a corrosive reality became clear. The problem or issue is never the 
alleged terrorism or connections with violent military extremists. The problem is race. White, 
protestants with an history of hate speech from Northern Ireland are worthy of a coalition, 
risking the highly volatile peace process in the region at the very point that Brexit negotiations 
evaluate the territorial border with the Republic. 
Such an unthinkable coalition required some groundwork during the Brexit campaign. 
Trump’s victory was not an isolated ideological car crash. Like Trump, Trump Studies arches 
beyond one man and one nation to capture the consequences of the double refusal in the 
interregnum. In light of the United Kingdom Brexit vote, the role of Nigel Farage, the leader 
of the United Kingdom Independence Party (Ukip), requires attention. He was fighting 
for the same social group and ‘problem’ as Donald Trump: the loss of white power.51 After 
championing the controversial, xenophobic and racist vote, he travelled to the United States 
and actively endorsed Donald Trump. It is startling that such a minor figure gained such a 
profile. He hooked profoundly racist ideas back into British politics.52 It was Enoch Powell-
esque or Powell-lite. Unlike other conservative British politicians before him such as Margaret 
Thatcher, Nigel Farage was (re)activating ‘white men’s burden’. Both Farage and Trump have 
been accused of overt and damaging racism yet they have risen in profile, steering a significant 
turn in global politics. In their rhetoric, both Trump and Farage fought to maintain the power 
of their white identity that is in danger of being compromised by progressive views.
Farage created false equivalence between the experiences of the colonizer and the colonized, 
minimizing the profound damage enacted to the languages of Indigenous peoples, faith 
structures, family structures, and relationships with the land. This false equivalence balances 
the ‘benign and really rather good’ parts of colonization, which significantly are not mentioned 
by name, and the people who are still reconciling with the consequences of invasion, genocide 
and dispossession.
It’s just that you know people emerge from colonialism with different views of the British. 
Some thought that they were benign and really rather good, and others saw them as foreign 
invaders that kept people suppressed. Obama’s family come from that second school of thought 
and it hasn’t quite left him yet.53
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In such a statement, race is seen to ‘perform a double function’.54 Firstly, it signifies 
geographical origins but perhaps more in line with cultural studies analyses, it also responds 
to Obama’s blackness as an othered and othering identity that gained power. The superiority 
of the white race is confirmed only through a colonial gauze. Farage viewed Barack Obama 
through a colonial lens, therefore deemed him inferior and dangerous. 
Barack Obama presented a direct contestation to white superiority. Obama through his 
presidency challenged what it meant to be black in the United States of America. The multiple 
mentions by Trump of ghettos55 and crime in Chicago were an attempt to wrestle the ideology 
from blackness as power to blackness as problem. Through his visible difference, Obama 
also ‘called into question the dominant coding’ of what it meant to be American.56 The fact 
that Farage had to position Barack Obama in colonial history reveals that race and cultural 
background play a pivotal role in who can hold power without questioning birth, religion 
or qualifications. In the construction of American identity, Pehrson, Brown, and Zagefka 
maintain that nationhood becomes linked with essentialist racial definitions, which summon 
an anti-immigrant prejudice.57 
Barack Obama fuelled the merging sparks of whiteness, nationalism and racism. Reviewing 
Trump’s campaign as compared to Obama’s previous campaigns, Trump did not emphasize 
issues of policy and goverance. Instead, his focus was more on nationalist sentiments and 
how he could be seen as the savior of the white race. The multicultural nature of the United 
States was viewed as a danger to the imagined singular whiteness that narrativized the 
nation’s origins and actively erased indigenous dispossession. As Gilroy confirmed, ‘We 
are living through a profound transformation in the way the idea of “race” is understood 
and acted upon’.58 This has been seen in countries such as Australia with the re-emergence 
and re-election of the right-wing nationalist party One Nation, in France with Marine Le 
Pen being a serious contender of the French presidency, and in the United Kingdom with 
the controversial Brexit vote. As a direct response to strengthen and perpetuate a singular 
bundling of nationalism and racism, invented fears and threats pull voters into ignorance and 
irrationality. Race and racism are now being viewed as something that has to be preserved 
through regular, banal and everyday topics of conversation.  
Stuart Hall termed this process ‘the great moving right show’.59 When he wrote these 
words, he was wrong. It was a mis-reading of Margaret Thatcher’s first term, which was much 
more volatile and unclear in its political directives than emerged after the Miner’s Strike. 
Thirty five years after he published these phrase, events have now caught up with his analysis. 
Hall argued that the, ‘Radical Right does not appear out of thin air. It has to be understood 
in direct relation to alternative political formations attempting to occupy and command the 
same space.’60 Political discourse, summoning fear and horror towards the visible other, has 
damaged the multicultural project, which was a ‘small l’ liberal and progressive policy, rather 
than a radical change. Kovel argues that the more abstract the language that is used to describe 
minorities in society, the more alienated and dehumanized they are, and the easier it is to 
control the types of discourse that they occupy.61 
What is startling is the similarity of language in this racialized project, even when 
statements are separated by place and time. Compare Margaret Thatcher’s commentary before 
her election as Prime Minister with Michael Fallon nearly forty years later. 
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People are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a 
different culture and, you know, the British character has done so much for democracy, for law 
and done so much throughout the world that if there is any fear that it might be swamped 
people are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming in.62
The Germans haven’t seen our proposals yet and we haven’t seen our proposals yet, and that’s 
still being worked on at the moment to see what we can do to prevent whole towns and 
communities being swamped by huge numbers of migrants. In some areas of the UK, down 
the east coast, towns do feel under siege, [with] large numbers of migrant workers and people 
claiming benefits, and it’s quite right we look at that.63
The hostility towards outsiders who do not respect ‘the British character’ either take the work 
or claim benefits that should be preserved for British-born citizens. The use of the word 
‘swamped’ remains significant.
Pauline Hanson’s One Nation ideology has a ‘plug in and play’ modality, where speeches can 
be separated by 20 years and the feared other can merely be replaced by another disempowered 
target.
I believe we are in danger of being swamped by Asians,
They have their own culture and religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate. 
Now we are in danger of being swamped by Muslims who bear a culture and ideology that 
is incompatible with our own.64
The word ‘swamped’ is a racist talisman, an epistemological power surge. It activated a swarm, 
but is also colour-activated. Whiteness is swamped, infiltrated, by colour.
Such sentiments fuse when Nigel Farage and Donald Trump met. Trump expressed his 
enthusiasm, obviously, through a tweet.
Many people would like to see @Nigel_Farage represent Great Britain as their Ambassador 
to the United States. He would do a great job!65
The false consensus, through phrases like ‘many people’, summon a ‘silent majority’ where 
none exists. In these comments, fierce effort is being exerted to protect whiteness from the 
un(der)defined other, migrants, who corrode national whiteness.66 The fact these words 
are being repeated in an almost viral fashion shows the banality of racism. When repeated 
often enough, even racism becomes acceptable. Twitter is the enabler to this conversation. 
Charles Krauthammer described Trump’s ‘need to dominate every news cycle feeds an almost 
compulsive tweet habit’.67 Language truncation, the use of images and hashtags, results in 
inappropriate, inaccurate or mis-judged commentary in 140 characters. Decades of accepting 
this language has created Donald Trump and enabled tweets. He summoned a campaign 
that was littered with fascist comments that were unchallenged. Through this great moving 
right show, the appointment of Steve Bannon as White House Chief Strategist was the 
most concerning of all the president’s choices. While he lasted less than a year in the job, the 
discursive framework was built.
Trump summoned a politics of grievance, rather than solutions. There was no audacity 
of hope, but angry howling at perceived injustice emerging through ‘fake news’, ‘positive 
discrimination’, feminism and alternative modes of masculinity beyond the heteronormative 
and procreative. To observe how these perceived injustices were applied, Larry Schweikart, 
member of the Trump campaign, stated, without footnote or reference:
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Over the next six years, it became virtually impossible to criticize Obama or his policies 
without risking charges of racism. In fact Obama was very much a ‘ruling class’ president, 
having attended an Ivy League college, and having received special considerations and favors 
throughout his career because of his race. He had very little in common with the millions of 
Americans who worked forty-hour-a-week jobs or ran their own small businesses, or who 
served in the military.68
The idea of a black man having intelligence, working hard, striving and succeeding had no 
place in such an ideology. The child of a single mother, from a mixed raced family, committed 
to education and community service did not function for the alt-right. Race was pivotal to 
the Trump victory. Trump was an answer (back) to Obama. This was a relational, fortress 
whiteness that drowned difference in its moat.
Schweikart went further, broadening the critique to the wider fight for black rights: ‘Black 
Lives Matter had no interest whatsoever in all ‘black lives,’ only in the relatively small number 
of blacks killed in police shootings that they could turn into anti-cop propaganda’.69 This 
statement confirms the challenge in the Trump discourse. While there appears to be nodes 
of reason, commentary and evidence-driven debates in some of these arguments, the jump 
to racist, sexist and homophobic ideology is rapid and ruthless. Black men have been killed 
by police when they have committed no crime. This is not ‘anti cop’ propaganda. This is a 
recognition that black men are killed at a higher rate than white men by the police.70 The hard 
lines on gun freedom and immigration control were undergirded by a disrespect of men and 
women with alternative lives outside of heteronormative, procreative, white experiences. Joel 
Pollak and Larry Schweikart stated that, ‘Trump was the best candidate possible for the times, 
while Clinton was possibly the worst’.71 Beyond hyperbole, what did this statement mean 
and––most importantly––was it accurate?
Whiteness matters to the answer of this question. George Lipsitz’s evocative phrase, ‘the 
possessive investment in whiteness’72, resonates with the Trump victory. Lipsitz argues that this 
possessive investment emerges through the collision of ‘public policy and private prejudice’.73 
The reinvigoration of nationalism as a white, colonizing, project is key to Trump’s victory and 
Brexit. Making America Great Again and ‘taking back’ Britain from Europeans is a way to 
invest and align two (seemingly) disparate ideologies: protectionism and neoliberalism. Joel 
Pollak, member of the Trump team, stated that ‘to Trump supporters, the candidate was the 
antidote to the twenty-five-year consensus in Washington about free trade, open borders, and 
transactional politics’.74 The alternative––protectionism, walls and unbridled ideology––are 
attempting to continue economics undergirded by finance and real estate capitalism. Yet both 
are founded on the free movement of people and capital. This paradox powers the double 
refusal.
Intellectuals in the interregnum
Much of Trump and Brexit can be described as an anti-intellectual turn in politics and daily 
life. Intelligent people, offering evidence-driven commentary and contributions to debate, 
were dismissed as irrelevant. Trump Studies returns the intellectual to anti-expertise times. 
Racism, sexism and homophobia are irrational. The only way to enable these discussions is to 
dismiss intelligence, scholarship and evidence. Michael Gove captured this remarkable turn 
in public discourse on Sky News on 3 June 2016: ‘I think the people in this country have had 
enough of experts from organisations with acronyms, saying they know what’s best and getting 
it consistently wrong’. The irriationality of Trump and Brexit are breathtaking. It is expected in 
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a neo-liberal age that votors would behave selfishly, or at least in their own best interests. Yet 
the areas of the UK that most gained from European subsidies voted to leave. The areas of the 
United States most impacted by Trump’s version of finance and real estate capitalism, from the 
‘rust belt’, voted for him. In this context, Ian Dunt’s commentary is convincing:
At the core of Britain’s current dilemma is a refusal to engage with objective fact. The debate 
about Brexit was lost, almost as soon as it began, in a tribal and emotional dogfight which 
bore little relation to reality.75
The key debate was a racist one: freedom of movement. The British voter wanted the right to 
live in Spain, Portugal, France or Germany, but did not wish European workers to have the 
right to live in the UK. The European Union is run by four freedoms: goods, capital, services 
and people. These four freedoms cannot be separated. Cornish cream cannot be sold without 
tariff in France while blocking French workers from managing a bar in Manchester.
Nationalism is a damaging and debilitating ideology. Benedict Anderson’s intricate 
historical theorization of ‘imagined communities’76 was more than a cliché or motif. He 
demonstrated the role of language, religion, the military, education and law in summoning 
arbitrary and artificial barriers, borders and limitations. The European Union was an imagined 
community. So is Welshness, Englishness and Scottishness. The arrogant assumption that 
Britain is somehow better than other members or the European Union will pose profound 
consequences for the Brexit ‘negotiations.’ The British, like Amerians, are not great, special, 
distinctive or worthy of special attention or relationships. The negotiations will end badly if the 
British negotiating position is based on their ‘special place’ in the world. As Dunt confirms, 
‘most of the time in politics, the simplest explanation is the best one. And the simplest 
explanation is that the Brexit ministers have come to believe their own nonsense.’77
Article 50 is the punishment clause from the EU. It is meant to be a warning to any 
member nation considering leaving the Union. It is also incredibly complex. There is no single 
Brexit. It requires very specific changes and challenges for administration, law and economics. 
After half a century of enmeshed European, English and Welsh, and Scottish laws, simple 
repeals and reorganizations will not suffice. The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ will create a cascade of 
consequences that will take decades to correct. Michael Ashcroft and Kevin Culwick showed 
the assumptions behind British dominance and Brexit: ‘Three things conferred clout, people 
thought: size, wealth and being a longstanding part of the European establishment. In other 
words, Germany ran the show’.78 Whether or not Germany ‘ran the show,’ alongside the idea 
that this is a rational reason to leave, demonstrates the presumption that Britain should ‘run 
the show.’ 
Brexit was so stunning because citizens did not act in their own best interests. Craig 
Oliver, the Director of Politics and Communications for David Cameron, confirmed that, ‘our 
campaign was based on the simple proposition that electorates don’t vote against their own 
pockets’.79 Reflecting on the failure of this project, Oliver could only offer that, ‘we struggled 
to communicate a complex truth in the face of simple lies’.80 Yet Cameron’s truth with Brexit 
is much more complex. In 2007 he gave a ‘cast iron guarantee’ to hold a referendum on the 
Lisbon Treaty. Referenda had been held previously. After Ted Heath’s Britain moved into 
the Common Market, 67% of the voting population confirmed in 1975 that they wished to 
stay in the EEC. Significantly, instead of posing a question on the Lisbon Treaty, an ‘all or 
nothing’ question was posed to the population. This summoned the Eurosceptic forces in 
the Conservative party.81 Significantly, the Brexit confirmed after the referendum was of a 
much greater scale and severity than predicted, or perhaps even desired, by the Brexiteers.82 
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Because of the vote and because of how it was framed, all the dog whistle topics erupted 
during the campaign. With Ukip strengthening and saying the unsayable about immigration, 
more reasoned discussions that did not activate xenophobia and nationalism became lost in 
a debate where bizarre equivalences were enacted, particularly with regard to the cost of EU 
membership and funding for the NHS. These dog whistles summoned a very complex group 
of just-majority voters,83 carefully configured by Tim Shipman:
The referendum represented a revolt of the provincial classes––ignored, maligned and 
impoverished––against the cosy metropolitan consensus on Europe, the benefits of immigration 
and the belief that national economic prosperity trumps personal experienced of hardship.84
The problem is that this group will only suffer further through disconnection from the EU. 
Costs of basic goods will increase and tariffs will be imposed on British goods.
US Senator Elizabeth Warren, in response to the Brexit-Trump nexus, stated that ‘the truth 
is that people are right to be angry’.85 Those who enacted the Global Financial Crisis through 
their greed and carelessness have not only fled responsibility, but gained from public subsidies 
of their excesses. Private profit was propped up by public subsidies of risk.86 Yet other variables 
such as deindustrialization, pollution, neglect of former industrial heartlands, increased cost 
of education and the structural inattention to both preventative health and primary care, has 
meant that righteous rage has been displaced into improper blame. The phrase ‘too big to 
fail,’ which was used to justify public bailouts of privately-run corporations, now applies more 
widely to the United States. If the lessons of the GFC are learned, then this time, there will 
be a realization that the US can fail, and the world will recover. Donald Trump signifies this 
interregnum, where US military, economic and political power has declined. Trump, who 
holds no government experience, displays an uneven temperament and hires his family in 
key positions, is the ‘outsider’ to manage this culture of angered, ill-focused blame. Brittany 
Packnett was clear: ‘White people handed us Donald Trump. White people did this’.87
White people––angry, frightened and xenophobic white people––are (mis)managing the 
consequences of decolonization and postcolonialism. The clichés of our language––it is as clear 
as black and white, black sheep, white wedding––demonstrate the connotations buried deep in 
our language. The clustering of nationalism, protectionism, militarism and Christianity means 
that anyone that operates outside of these parameters, no matter how judiciously or carefully, 
is ridiculed and harpooned with a breath-taking harshness. The treatment of Jeremy Corbyn, 
the Labour Opposition Leader in the UK, demonstrates that the pillaring of Hillary Clinton 
was not simply a gendered outlier attack. Corbyn’s anti-racist activist career, fighting apartheid, 
alongside his pacifism means that his name, like Hillary’s, is a dog whistle on both the left and 
the right. The Blairites in his own party will not serve on his front bench. The conservatives 
abuse his suits, his speech and his gentle but considered commitments. The Daily Mail 
screamed a headline on June 3, 2017, less than one week before the British election. ‘Corbyn’s 
Nuclear Meltdown’, featured on the first page, emerged because, ‘Jeremy Corbyn last night 
refused to say whether he would defend Britain from nuclear attack’.88 The assumption that 
there is a way to defend any nation or person from a nuclear attack is muted. But significantly, 
an article on page two, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) charging Craig Mackinlay, a 
Conservative candidate, with electoral expenses fraud did not attack the candidate, but the 
CPS. The headline––‘Why now?’––did not probe the spending of tax payers money, but simply 
undermined the credibility of the CPS.89
Jeremy Corbyn has managed a scale of personal attacks equivalent to Hillary Clinton, 
which is a rare treatment for a heterosexual, white man. But he has a policy that is even more 
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dangerous than Clinton’s portfolio: pacifism and deep caution when considering military 
solutions. Violence has been justified since 11 September 2001 as preventing terrorism. Yet in 
such an environment, the brutal murder of Jo Cox, a Member of Parliament on the campaign 
trail arguing for the value of the European Union to the British people, was enacted not by 
a follower of Islam, a migrant, a refugee or a radical. Cox was killed by Thomas Mair. Mair 
was a Nazi sympathizer who was aggrieved by Cox’s support for refugees. He appeared at her 
constituency surgery in Birstall, shot her with a shotgun and repeatedly stabbed her. Expressed 
clearly, a white man killed a white woman while she was at work. The foundation for this 
murder was her affirmation of anti-racism and anti-xenophobia. The avoidance of these facts 
and interpretations must be addressed. 
This is a tragic story. But Thomas Mair’s words after shooting Cox remain resonant and 
gritty in their horror: ‘Britain first. Britain will always come first’.90 Britain, the United 
States, Australia, Canada must not come first and allow the global issues of climate, work, 
homelessness, education, health and injustice to remain a suppliant to raw, vulgar nationalism. 
Trump Studies stands as an intellectual reminder that the cult of personality, conducting 
foreign policy via Twitter, and fetishizing arbitrary borders to configure social and economic 
policy is not – and has never been – sufficient for democracy, let alone scholarship.91
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